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Highlights 
 Spatial integration of renewable energy requires institutional harmonization. 
 Institutional harmonization requires insight in dynamic, interrelated institutions.  
 Harmonization is conditioned by actors’ ideas and interpretation of institutions.  
 Harmonization between policy domains also requires harmonization in these domains. 
 Research is needed regarding the role of agency in improving harmonization. 
 
Abstract 
This paper develops an analytical approach to explore institutional barriers to spatial integration between 
renewable energy (RE) and other land use functions and provides insight into opportunities for 
institutional harmonization between involved policy domains. Spatial integration of RE with other land 
use functions provides opportunities to use limited amounts of space more efficiently, allowing for a more 
fluent roll-out of renewable technologies. However, such integration requires the involvement of various 
policy domains that are each guided by specific institutional frameworks, which are often tailored to 
specific sectoral needs. Therefore, spatial integration of RE and other land use functions requires 
institutional harmonization between involved policy domains. However, there is limited guidance in 
literature on how such harmonization does or could occur. Moreover, while literature on RE recognizes 
the merits of institutional approaches, it focuses on institutions as the formal rules of the game, often 
disregarding the agency component (the ‘play of the game’). The analytical approach developed in this 
paper combines the Institutional Analysis and Development framework with insights from Discursive 
Institutionalism. The approach enables structured assessment of relationships within and between 
established institutions (the ‘rules of the game’) and actors’ ideas, interpretations and deliberations 
regarding these institutions (the ‘play of the game’), providing insight in processes of institutional 
harmonization. This analytical approach is applied to the case of spatial integration of photovoltaics with 
national transport infrastructure networks in the Netherlands. The findings from the case show that (1) 
insight in interrelations between institutional barriers is crucial for addressing institutional harmonization; 
(2) institutional harmonization within policy domains is a precondition for harmonization between policy 
domains; and (3) the agency component (play of the game) is key to successful harmonization. In 
conclusion, the analytical approach provides insight into the co-evolution between the rules of the game 
and the play of the game, which is pivotal to institutional harmonization. 
 
Key Words: Renewable energy; Transport infrastructure; Spatial integration; Institutional analysis; IAD 





The Paris Agreement on climate change, signed in 2015, shows an increased global sense of urgency to 
shift towards a low fossil carbon society (Suzuki et al., 2016). This shift involves widespread application 
of renewable energy (RE) technologies (Mignon and Bergek, 2016). However, RE generation requires 
extensive amounts of space and is highly visible in the landscape because of the relatively low power 
density of renewable sources compared to fossil sources (Scheidel and Sorman, 2012; Smil, 2006). Power 
density (in W/m
2
) provides insight into the spatial requirements of various energy sources. Whereas fossil 






 (Smil, 2006), the 
power density of renewables is approximately 0.5 to 1.5 W/m
2
 for wind energy and 4 to 9 W/m
2
 for solar 
photovoltaics (PV) (Scheidel and Sorman, 2012). The concept of power density, however, does not take 
into account the possibility for combining land use functions. To illustrate, wind turbines or solar panels 
can often be placed upon grounds used primarily for other purposes, such as housing, agriculture or 
transportation. Such spatial integration of RE production with other land use functions creates integrated 
energy landscapes which, especially in densely populated regions, appears to be necessary for making the 
transition towards low fossil carbon societies (De Boer and Zuidema, 2015).  
 Transport infrastructure is one of the land use functions providing opportunities for spatial 
integration with RE. The most viable options for such integration include placing wind turbines or solar 
panels on left-over spaces along highways, highway nodes, and sound screens (Frantál et al., 2018; Volpe, 
2012; Wadhawan and Pearce, 2017). Areas along infrastructure are suitable for RE production for a 
number of reasons: (1) these areas are already under environmental pressure due to air and sound pollution 
and, therefore, offer limited use-value besides the primary function of providing accessibility (van der 
Horst, 2007); (2) infrastructure networks are usually government-owned, making it easier for governments 
to develop these areas because they have powers beyond incentivizing development; (3) combinations of 
RE with infrastructure networks are supported by government ambitions and experimentation, e.g. in the 
US (Volpe, 2012), the UK (Highways England, 2016; Parker, 2015), Germany (Frantál et al., 2018) and 
the Netherlands (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2016). To illustrate, the Dutch Ministry 
of Infrastructure and the Environment wrote a letter to parliament in 2016, expressing the ambition to 
make the national transportation infrastructure networks, managed by its executive organization 
Rijkswaterstaat, energy neutral by 2030 (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2016).  
Despite these opportunities and ambitions, few integrated RE and transport infrastructure projects 
have been implemented so far in the Netherlands and abroad. One of the main challenges appears to be 
that spatial integration of RE with other land use functions requires the involvement of various policy 
domains. These domains are each guided by specific institutional frameworks and related practices, which 
are often tailored to specific sectoral needs. Institutional barriers occur because existing frameworks and 
practices create an overload of rules which can be contradictory (Grotenbreg and van Buuren, 2018; 
Negro et al., 2012). Moreover, there appears to be a disconnection between existing (sectoral) institutional 
frameworks and new ideas and practices that are arising related to RE (Lammers and Heldeweg, 2016). 
Simultaneously, there are few rules aimed specifically at integrated projects (Grotenbreg and van Buuren, 
2018). As a consequence, such integrated projects face a high degree of institutional ambiguity, or even an 
institutional void, which Hajer (2006) describes as “a situation in which there is no single ‘constitution’ 
that pre-determines where and how a legitimate decision is to be taken. Actors bring their own 
assumptions about rules and authority” (p.43).  
The above discussion illustrates that the spatial integration of RE and other land use functions 
appears to be hampered by uncoordinated and ill-adjusted institutions, as well as a lack of specific 
institutions accommodating the issue at hand. As Suzuki et al. (2016) argue in a special issue of this 
journal, “harmonization of existing and new policies and institutions is key” (p. 4) if the world is to move 
towards low fossil carbon societies. However, existing literature does not address how institutional 
harmonization does or could occur. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore institutional barriers that 
hamper such harmonization efforts, so as to provide insight into how institutional harmonization can be 
enhanced to improve spatial integration between RE and other land use functions, using the case of 
transport infrastructure.  
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The focus on institutions stems from the observation that spatial integration between RE and 
transport infrastructure has been addressed primarily from a technological perspective (e.g. Debije et al., 
2018; Vallati et al., 2015; Wadhawan and Pearce, 2017). These observations are in line with Andrews-
Speed (2016), who states that in energy transition literature in general, there appear to be few explicit 
institutional analyses that draw on insights from institutional theory. Nevertheless, the role of institutions 
in understanding transition dynamics is academically appreciated. For example, Geels et al (2016) and 
Turnheim et al. (2015) position institutional perspectives as essential parts of the analytical approach 
applied in socio-technical analysis. They perceive institutions primarily as structuring forces on the meso-
level, focusing on the importance of national policies and regulations for constraining or stimulating 
transitions. In addition, Cherp et al (2018) emphasize the importance of institutional theory in explaining 
national energy transitions. However, in line with the observation by Andrews-Speed (2016), neither of 
these authors explicitly engage with institutional analysis. Instead, they highlight the importance of such 
analyses in energy transitions literature and emphasize the need to account for the multiple socio-technical 
sub-systems that co-evolve across spatial and institutional scales. For example, Geels et al (2016) call for 
approaches that combine more meso-level socio-technical analysis with insights from micro-level 
initiatives or practice-based learning. Moreover, while highlighting the energy transition as an 
encompassing societal transition, these authors focus largely on institutions related to the domain of 
energy policies. Hence, there is limited attention for policy integration and harmonization between energy 
policies and other policy domains or land use functions. 
Institutions also receive attention in literature on the diffusion of RE technologies. Within this 
literature (e.g. Mignon and Bergek, 2016; Negro et al., 2012; Reddy and Painuly, 2004), the focus lies 
mainly on formal (or hard) institutional barriers, such as a lack of continuity in policies, laws and 
regulations, the shifting attention of policy makers, misalignment of policies between sectors and 
government levels, and inadequate support schemes (Negro et al., 2012). Informal (or soft) barriers are 
mentioned primarily in relation to the active lobby against RE by certain actors and societal resistance 
against the implementation of RE projects (Negro et al., 2012). Besides barriers categorized as 
‘institutional’, a number of other barriers are mentioned including those related to physical infrastructure, 
interactions, finances, markets, behavior, and capacities (Mignon and Bergek, 2016; Negro et al., 2012; 
Reddy and Painuly, 2004). These ‘other’ barriers appear to be conceptualized as non-institutional. 
However, institutional theory posits that human behavior and interaction are shaped by institutions (North, 
1991; Ostrom, 2005) and shape institutions (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Schmidt, 2008, 2010). Hence, a 
part of these ‘other’ barriers can be considered institutional themselves. The above argument illustrates a 
research gap in literature on RE generation: this literature does not appear to recognize institutions as both 
shaping and being shaped by actor behavior and interactions. Therefore, a shift in perspective is needed 
away from understanding institutions as merely formal rules and frameworks on the meso-level to an 
understanding inclusive of informal institutions and actor behavior and interaction.  
This paper will contribute to such a new understanding. Specifically, this paper addresses the 
research gap identified above, by developing an analytical approach that captures the dynamic interplay 
between various formal and informal rules and how involved actors interpret shape and reshape them in 
processes of institutional harmonization. The approach developed is based on the Institutional Analysis 
and Development (IAD) framework by Ostrom (2005), which provides insight into formal and informal 
institutions that actors abide to (called the ‘rules of the game’ in this paper). The IAD framework is 
combined with insights from Discursive Institutionalism (DI) as developed by Schmidt (2008, 2010), 
which applies a more dynamic conceptualization of institutions as simultaneously influencing and being 
influenced by actors (called the ‘play of the game’ in this paper). As such, the analytical approach is 
thoroughly grounded in institutional theory. Moreover, in line with the call by Geels et al.(2016), this 
paper takes into account the co-evolution between the structuring dynamics of policies and regulations at 
the meso-level and actors’ interpretations, ideas and deliberations at the micro-level. The theoretical 
background and development of this analytical approach is described in section 2.  
This paper explicitly addresses the issues of institutional harmonization between policy domains 
by applying the analytical approach to the case of spatial integration between solar photovoltaics (PV) and 
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transport infrastructure in the Netherlands. This is a specific type of integration between RE and transport 
infrastructure where PV is placed on left-over spaces along highways, highway nodes, or sound screens. 
As described above, this is currently one of the most viable options for integrated RE and transport 
infrastructure projects (Volpe, 2012), but due to institutional barriers there are few projects actually 
realized. This case is further described in section 3. In section 4, the analytical approach is applied to the 
case. The results first detail the rules of the game that structure the current situation. Second, institutional 
barriers and opportunities for harmonization are presented, taking into account both the rules and the play 
of the game. Subsequently, section 5 contains the discussion and conclusion.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
In institutional theory, institutions are commonly referred to as ‘rules’ (Hodgson, 2006; North, 1990; 
Ostrom, 2005). North (1990) defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally 
[…] the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (p.3). Generally, a distinction is made 
between formal and informal rules (Kingston and Caballero, 2009; North, 1991; Ostrom, 2005). Formal 
rules are explicit, written down and enforced by actors with specific roles, including constitutions, laws, 
and policies. Informal rules are implicit, lack clear specification, and are enforced endogenously, 
including conventions, norms, and codes of conduct (Kingston and Caballero, 2009; North, 1991). 
Institutional frameworks are formed by interaction between such formal and informal rules (North, 1991), 
forming multi-layered, nested hierarchies of rules (Ostrom, 2005). Institutional frameworks are often 
presented as stable, enduring arrangements that structure actors’ strategies and actions (North, 1991; 
Ostrom, 2005).  
However, this understanding of institutions is criticized for its static understanding of institutions 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Schmidt, 2008, 2010) and the dominance of structure (rules) over agency 
(action and interaction) (Schmidt, 2008). Discursive institutionalism (DI) emphasizes the importance of 
acknowledging that institutions encompass both structure and agency (Schmidt, 2008, 2010). The DI 
perspective on institutions embraces a more dynamic perspective on institutions, in which institutional 
change is perceived as a constant process in the background, fueled by actors’ current behavior. Therefore, 
this paper develops an analytical approach which allows for institutions to structure actors’ behavior 
through the ‘rules of the game’, while simultaneously being shaped and changed by this behavior in the 
‘play of the game’.  
This paper applies the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework (Ostrom, 2011, 
2005, 1990) to systematically analyze the ‘rules of the game’ that apply to the spatial integration between 
PV and transport infrastructure. The IAD framework is useful because it is one of the few frameworks that 
operationalizes institutional analysis in a systematic manner. However, the IAD framework does take a 
rather static view on institutions as arrangements that structure behavior, and thereby can be subject to the 
criticism that it focusses primarily on structure, and is “better at explaining continuity than change” 
(Schmidt, 2010, p. 2). This is problematic, because institutional barriers appear to occur on the boundary 
between continuity and change, i.e. the moment that institutional frameworks are focusing on continuity, 
while institutional change is required to encourage the harmonization that is necessary to improve the 
spatial integration between RE and other land use functions.  
Ostrom and Basurto (2011) also acknowledge the importance of “analytical tools for analyzing 
dynamic situations – particularly institutional change” (p. 317). However, the analytical tool they 
developed to study “the evolution of rules and norms” (Ostrom and Basurto, 2011, p. 317) maintains a 
rules-following logic. Their aim is to identify changes in rule-configurations over time. Essentially, this 
tool aims to record processes of change but does not focus on the mechanisms behind these changes. By 
developing an analytical approach for identifying institutional barriers on the boundary between continuity 






Fig. 1 Interaction between ‘rules of the game’ and ‘the play of the game’ through which actors 
deliberate and change rules, as indicated by the double arrows (adapted from Ostrom, 2011). 
 
The IAD framework focusses on an ‘action situation’, which is defined as “the social spaces 
where individuals interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight” 
(Ostrom, 2011, p. 11). The IAD framework identifies seven types of rules that structure an action situation 
(Ostrom, 2005): (1) Position rules relate to actors being in certain positions, (2) Boundary rules relate to 
actors entering or leaving positions, (3) Choice rules relate to actors doing certain actions, (4) Aggregation 
rules relate to actors (jointly) affecting control over action-outcome linkages, (5) Information rules relate 
to the sending or receiving of information, (6) Scope rules relate to the occurrence of outcomes, and (7) 
Payoff rules relate to paying or receiving costs or benefits. The action verbs in these rules (to be, enter or 
leave, do, jointly affect, send or receive, occur and pay or receive) are important identifiers for the 
different types of rules. These rules are what Ostrom (2005) calls ‘rules-in-use’. Thereby, the IAD 
framework mainly captures those rules that have been established deliberately and that are applied and 
enforced in some manner (Kingston and Caballero, 2009). As a consequence, there is no explicit attention 
to the individual agency of actors in how they interpret, use and also transform these rules through their 
behavior and interactions. To bring the action situation ‘to life’, there is a need to present a dynamic action 
situation in which actors function as agents that are not only rule-following but simultaneously rule-
shaping (see Fig. 1). Besides a more traditional analysis of the ‘rules of the game’, the analytical approach 
developed here also includes an analysis of the ideas of actors regarding the rules of the game; i.e. how 
they interpret, reflect on, deliberate or respond to these rules (see Fig. 1). This means that each variable in 
the IAD framework is operationalized in a manner that allows for an analysis of (1) the ‘rules of the 
game’, and (2) actors’ ideas, interpretations and deliberations regarding how these rules should be 
reframed, ignored or abolished in what is called the ‘play of the game’ (see Table 1). 
In its original form, the IAD framework provides insight in who may, must or must not do 
something, how, when and where. Thereby, it can only provide insight in institutional barriers that are a 
result of conflicting ‘rules of the game’. The addition of the DI perspective broadens the range of 
institutional barriers and opportunities captured by the IAD framework, through including a more dynamic 
view on institutions which takes into account the ‘play of the game’: i.e. actors’ ideas, interpretations and 
deliberations regarding how rules should be reframed, ignored or abolished. This analytical approach, 




Table 1  
Analytical approach for studying both the ‘rules of the game’ and the ‘play of the game’ 
 
Variables Rules Action 
verb 
Rules of the game based 
on Ostrom (2005) 
Default conditions  
(Ostrom and Basurto, 
2011, p. 324) 
Play of the game  
Positions Position 
rules 
Be Define the positions that 
can be held by actors. 
 
Anyone can enter Ideas regarding the roles 
actors should uptake and 







Define who may enter or 
leave positions and how. 
 
No formal positions 
exist 
Ideas regarding the actors 
that should be involved, 
how and when.  
 
Actions Choice rules Do Define what actors in 
certain positions may, 
must or must not do under 
specific conditions or at 
certain points. 
 




responsibilities that actors 










Define how actors jointly 
affect decisions regarding 
proposed actions and 




Ideas regarding (criteria 







Define what information is 
to be send and received by 
which actors, at what 
moment, and using which 
channels.  
Each player can 
communicate any 
information via any 




information that should be 
shared between actors and 
how learning should occur. 
 
Outcomes  Scope rules Occur Define which outcomes 
may, must, or must not 
occur 
Each player can affect 
any state of the world 
that is physically 
possible 
 
Ideas regarding outcomes 





Payoff rules Pay or 
receive 
Define costs and benefits 
to be payed or received by 
actors 
 
Any player can obtain 
any outcome that the 
player can physically 
obtain and defend 
Ideas regarding the 
distribution of costs and 
benefits among actors. 
 
The analytical approach developed in this paper helps identify institutional barriers as a result of 
mismatches within and between the ‘rules of the game’ and the ‘play of the game’. For example, two rules 
of the game can be contradictory, or rules of the game can be challenged by actors in the play of the game. 
Moreover, the analytical approach helps identify barriers that are a result of actors’ deliberations in 
situations where there is a lack of rules. As explained by Hajer (2006), a lack of rules can create high 
institutional ambiguity or even an institutional void. Ostrom (2005) defines default conditions for each 
variable, which reflect the structure of an action situation in which there are no rules (see Table 1). High 
institutional ambiguity or an institutional void can, therefore, be recognized by the approximation of such 
a default condition. Moreover, by examining relations within and between the ‘rules of the game’ and the 
‘play of the game’, interrelations between institutional opportunities and barriers can be identified. 
 
3. Material and methods 
3.1 Empirical case  
This paper applies the analytical approach to the case of spatial integration between PV and transport 
infrastructure, referring to the placement of PV on left-over spaces along highways, highway nodes, or 
(integrated in) sound screens in the Netherlands. The focus lies on highways as national-level transport 
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infrastructure. The asset manager for national infrastructure in the Netherlands is Rijkswaterstaat, which is 
the executive organization for the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. However, developing 
PV in combination with transport infrastructure requires cooperation and coordination between 
Rijkswaterstaat and other organizations across multiple scales. The Netherlands has a unitary 
governmental system with various degrees of decentralization depending on the specific policy field. This 
means that the national government is the locus of power, but that responsibilities are often delegated to 
provinces and municipalities (EC, 1997). Regarding spatial planning many responsibilities have been 
decentralized to provinces and municipalities, including the responsibility to issue environmental permits 
for PV installations. Thereby, the case incorporates multi-level and multi-interactional complexity, as 
suggested by De Leeuw and Gössling (2016) for analysis of institutional change processes. 
 Spatial integration between PV and transport infrastructure is gaining prominence in the 
Netherlands. As a result, rules are shifting from a reactive role towards a more proactive role for 
Rijkswaterstaat. Until 2015, citizen initiatives, provinces or municipalities could approach Rijkswaterstaat 
with ideas for solar initiatives and after deliberation Rijkswaterstaat could decide to support these 
initiatives. Very few initiatives were realized in this manner. In 2015 all applications and discussions were 
put on hold because a new system was going to be developed in which locations must be auctioned. The 
rules of the game described in this paper are the rules regarding the system as it is being developed. 
Therefore, this paper presents the rules of the game of the new situation as it is being implemented, as well 
as the ideas, deliberations, and negotiations of actors regarding these rules in the play of the game.  
 
3.2 Methods of data collection 
This paper is based on qualitative data, gathered using in-depth interviews and a focus group. A total of 14 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted in the second half of 2016 and early 2017. In the 
design of the interview guides, questions were organized according to the variables of the IAD framework. 
Respondents included officials from the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, Rijkswaterstaat, 
the Central Government Real Estate Agency, the regional department of Rijkswaterstaat in the North of 
the Netherland, officials from the three Northern provinces, a consultancy firm, an energy company, and 
an electricity grid operator. A list of interviews is provided in Table A.1 in the Appendix. To triangulate 
findings from the interviews (Yin, 2014), a focus group with officials from Rijkswaterstaat, the Central 
Government Real Estate Agency and the Netherlands Enterprise Organization was held in June 2017.  
 
3.3 Methods of data analysis  
Transcripts of the interviews and focus groups were coded using the software Atlas.ti. Codes followed the 
structure of Table 1, which provides (1) the definitions of the seven variables of the IAD framework to 
capture the rules of the game, and (2) the adapted definitions of these variables regarding actors’ ideas, 
deliberations and negotiations about these rules to capture the play of the game. Codes were assigned to 
interview quotes based on their latent content to capture the underlying meaning of the data. Subsequently, 
manifest coding was used to identify different rules and ideas within each variable (Babbie, 2010). A 
consideration was that the perception of a single interviewee could bias included ideas. In order to 
overcome this, only ideas that were mentioned on two separate occasions were included in the results.  
In the result section, references are made to the Appendix, where the rules of the game are 
presented in Table A.2. The ideas related to these rules (the play of the game) are presented in Table A.3. 
These tables were structured using the seven types of variables defined in the IAD framework. Each 
variable is assigned a different letter (e.g. B or Ib for boundary rules) and each rule and idea related to the 
rules is given a number (e.g. B1 or Ib1 respectively).  
 
4. Results of the institutional analysis  
4.1 Establishing the action situation: the rules of the game  
Before discussing institutional barriers and opportunities, this subsection first describes the action 
situation for PV on Rijkswaterstaat lands based on the analysis of the rules of the game (Table A.2). A 
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generalized action situation is presented in Figure 2, while acknowledging that the exact composition of 
action situations also depends on the specific project (B3).  
 
  
Fig. 2 The action situation for photovoltaics (PV) on Rijkswaterstaat lands. After forming a 
new cabinet in October 2017 some shifts occurred in the division of responsibilities for the 
Ministries. The Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment is now called the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Water Management and the Ministry of Economic Affairs has become the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate. This figure depicts the situation as it was when 
the data was gathered.  
 
Rijkswaterstaat is the executive organization of the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment and responsible for the management of national transport infrastructure (P3). This means 
that they receive their assignments from the Ministry (P2) and that the Ministry drafts legislation related to 
Rijkswaterstaat (P1). Rijkswaterstaat may appoint locations for energy generation for their own purpose of 
becoming energy neutral and for the purpose of energy generation for third parties on their lands (C2). 
Rijkswaterstaat may not hold the position of the developer and owner of energy installations (P4); as 
stated in the ‘Letter to parliament regarding energy neutral networks managed by Rijkswaterstaat, “with 
renewable energy generation for ‘own’ purposes […], it is meant that Rijkswaterstaat will become the 
owner of the associated guarantees of origin” (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2016, p. 
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3). As a result, there is always a third party involved as developer and owner of the installation (P4), while 
Rijkswaterstaat will become the owner of the guarantee of origin; i.e. the certificates that prove that 
electricity was produced by renewable sources. Moreover, Rijkswaterstaat is the licensing authority for the 
permit on the basis of the Public Works Act (P5).  
The Central Government Real Estate Agency is the contract holder for state-owned land (P6) and 
the party who must organize an auction for the locations appointed by Rijkswaterstaat (C4). The Ministry 
of Internal Affairs drafts legislation related to the Central Government Real Estate Agency (P1). Potential 
developers, including both market parties and citizen initiatives, can participate in the auction (P4), with 
the highest bid gaining rights to develop and operate the PV installation (B4). Subsequently, the developer 
must apply for an environmental permit with the municipality or the province (C6). Moreover, an 
agreement must be reached with the local grid operator regarding the grid connection (C9). After 
receiving the necessary permits, the developer may apply for subsidies with the Netherlands Enterprise 
Organization (C10), which is part of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (P1). Government organizations 
are not eligible for subsidies (Y3).  
 
4.2 Identifying institutional barriers and opportunities for harmonization  
There is a rich variety of institutional barriers and opportunities for institutional harmonization, as Tables 
A.2 (rules of the game) and A.3 (play of the game) convincingly show. Based on a comparison between 
the barriers and opportunities mentioned in both tables, it is possible to identify various dominant issues 
regarding the harmonization between PV and infrastructure policies.  
The first of these is the high institutional ambiguity regarding the role and responsibility of 
Rijkswaterstaat in the broader energy transition. Although Rijkswaterstaat and the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment have ambitions related to spatial integration of PV and transport 
infrastructure for the purpose of making the national infrastructure networks energy neutral (S5), many 
institutional barriers appear to be the result of a lack of ‘ownership’ of Rijkswaterstaat regarding the 
general opportunity of placing PV on its lands (Ip4). The Ministry does recognize such an opportunity, 
expressed in a letter to parliament stating that “the lands managed by Rijkswaterstaat offer considerable 
potential for the production of renewable energy which reaches further than the ‘own’ use of the 
organization” (Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, 2016, p. 3). Nevertheless, there are no 
rules defining the role and responsibility of Rijkswaterstaat regarding the energy transition in general 
(Ip2). In being an executive agency, Rijkswaterstaat is used to being clearly informed by the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment about its responsibilities, which are often expressed in clear targets 
(P3).  
Facing no explicit targets for RE, taking initiative regarding energy projects is open to individual 
interpretation of formal and informal rules by Rijkswaterstaat’s managers and employees (Ia5). When 
asked why Rijkswaterstaat is working on RE issues, many of the interviewees refer to the targets set in the 
Dutch Energy Agreement and the Paris agreement as the broader scope for action (S4), as well as the 
aforementioned letter to parliament for the target of becoming energy neutral (S5). However, many of the 
interviewees also refer to a lack of scope rules that translate this broad ambition (14% RE by 2020 in the 
Energy Agreement) into specific targets for Rijkswaterstaat (Is4). As a result, there are a number of 
conflicting ideas regarding the responsibilities and scope for Rijkswaterstaat. First, there are various ideas 
regarding the approach for reaching energy neutrality. For example, some interviewees emphasize the 
need to quickly realize a few large wind parks or solar-fields that together cover the energy use of 
Rijkswaterstaat. Others emphasize that energy neutrality should be pursued by integrating RE in 
infrastructure projects, thereby slowly realizing many smaller initiatives. Second, there are various ideas 
on whether Rijkswaterstaat should just aim for energy neutrality, or whether they should also support third 
party initiatives and thus contribute to the national energy ambitions (Is4). In March 2017, Rijkswaterstaat 
created a new position within the organization for a ‘managing director (HID) sustainability and 
environment’, expecting that this new director will make choices regarding the translation of abstract 
goals into a scope for action (Ip4). Simultaneously, during multiple interviews and the focus group, 
warnings were outed that a narrow scope which is focused solely on achieving Rijkswaterstaat’s 
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ambitions, might limit opportunities for the energy transition in the Netherlands as a whole (Is3). Clearly, 
for pursuing improved harmonization of RE with infrastructure there is also a need for internal 
harmonization within Rijkswaterstaat on its ambitions and role.  
A second dominant issue relates to the fragmentation of responsibilities for PV on Rijkswaterstaat 
lands. Rijkswaterstaat must cooperate with other parties to realize PV on their own land (Ia4), but there 
are no procedures for joint decision-making regarding PV in combination with transport infrastructure; the 
aggregation rules resemble the default condition that “players act independently” (see Table 1). Because 
developers are dependent on a succession of decisions regarding permits and contracts with various parties 
(C2-C10), the lack of rules causes uncertainties and risks. An example of such a barrier is the position rule 
that either the province or the municipality is the licensing authority responsible for handing out the 
environmental permit (P6). This lack of clarity on roles can be illustrated using the following citation: 
“The locations that came forth do not fit the provincial policy regarding solar parks. But that is a bit of a 
discussion point. Whether it is a provincial responsibility. Because […] the municipality gave the 
environmental permit for these locations. […] And it fits their perspective perfectly” (Interview 
employees Province of Friesland). Without procedures for joint decision making, coordination between 
provinces and municipalities is crucial, let alone the need to also include the Central Government Real 
Estate Agency as the contract-holder and grid operators for access to the grid (Ib1). Currently, 
coordination depends on voluntary action (Ii1). With outcomes being open-ended, developers face serious 
risks of not being granted a permit. In response, many interviewees consider early involvement of 
municipalities, provinces, grid operators and the surrounding area in area-based conversations as 
necessary for coordinating decisions (Ic2) and for broader communication of related interests (Ii1). Ideas 
such as joint map making are presented by Rijkswaterstaat as a manner of communicating interests in such 
settings (Ic2). However, the main institutional barrier hindering participation of Rijkswaterstaat and the 
Central Government Real Estate Agency is the lack of resources in both time and money (Iy2). Moreover, 
it is unclear who needs to take the initiative in organizing these sessions (Ip4), which illustrates the lack of 
ownership and urgency regarding the broader opportunity for energy generation on Rijkswaterstaat lands.  
Thirdly, interrelations between choice and payoff rules also play a large role in deliberations 
regarding the division of responsibilities. This can be illustrated using the example of citizen involvement. 
According to Rijkswaterstaat and the Central Government Real Estate Agency, citizen involvement is the 
responsibility of municipalities and provinces (Ic6). Due to resource constraints (Iy2), Rijkswaterstaat and 
the Central Government Real Estate Agency want to keep the process as simple and uniform as possible 
(Ia3). A simple and uniform process for them means reducing the amount of parties involved in the 
process (Ia1) and limiting the amount of criteria for assessing bids, thus focusing purely on price (Ia3). 
Therefore, every interested party, including citizen initiatives, is allowed to submit a bid in potential 
auctions of Rijkswaterstaat land (C5). However, this focus on auctioning lands to the highest bidder (Y6) 
creates a number of problems for citizen involvement. First, citizen initiatives are bound to one location 
and often lack knowledge, competences and experience to compete with market parties (Ib2). Second, 
Rijkswaterstaat and the Central Government Real Estate Agency do not create incentives for developers to 
embed quality criteria, such as citizen involvement, in their bid (Iy5); contrary, involving such criteria 
might cost developers the bid because citizen involvement requires resources which might results in lower 
bid prices. Simultaneously, provinces and municipalities often emphasize the importance of citizen 
involvement in their environmental plans (Is7). Not involving citizens, therefore might lead to problems 
for developers with obtaining the environmental permit and possibly to resistance of citizens regarding PV 
on Rijkswaterstaat lands. This is largely an issue of institutional harmonization between different 
Ministries regarding payoff rules and between different levels, including national, provincial and 
municipal actors, regarding choice rules.  
Barriers are also caused by the interrelation between strict interpretations of position and scope 
rules in the play of the game, which is related to the lack of clarity on the position of Rijkswaterstaat 
regarding the energy transition. Since Rijkswaterstaat does not have an explicit task beyond energy 
generation for its ‘own’ purposes there appear to be few rules that ensure that employees have an open 
attitude towards PV initiatives (Ip1). Contrary, employees from both the energy company and the 
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consultancy firm experienced that Rijkswaterstaat staff, particularly specialists and operational staff, often 
apply strict interpretations of their ‘traditional’ responsibilities and tasks on PV initiatives, even though 
the rules of the games do not necessarily prescribe this. Rijkswaterstaat has a ‘traditional’ focus on safety 
and accessibility, implying an informal rule encouraging risk-averse attitudes among Rijkswaterstaat staff 
(Ip1). This can be illustrated using the example of risk-assessment: in the aforementioned letter to 
parliament, the only condition is that energy facilities must not compromise the safety of infrastructure 
networks (S2). However, it is unclear when safety is compromised or not (Is2). For example, in the case of 
transport of hazardous substances, acceptable risk-levels are determined. In the case of PV initiatives it is 
unclear what risk-levels are considered acceptable (Is2). Static interpretations of tasks and responsibilities 
combined with a lack of knowledge often result in inertia and rejection. This illustrates that informal rules 
guiding individual employees can be very influential for the outcomes of PV initiatives, and that positive 
attitudes at a strategic level within Rijkswaterstaat need to be communicated to specialists and operational 
staff (Ia6; Ii3). 
Another consequence of the large role of informal rules in guiding individual employees is that 
information sharing occurs on an ad hoc basis, without clear learning objectives (Ii1; Ii2). Besides 
standard procedures for auctions and permits, information rules resemble the default condition that “each 
player can communicate any information via any channel available to the player” (Ostrom and Basurto, 
2011, p. 324). As a result, essential information for projects is sometimes shared late, or not at all (Ii5). 
Moreover, there is no obligation for early consulting with other actors regarding initiatives (Ii1). This is 
problematic because e.g. the financial feasibility of an initiative depends heavily on the proximity and 
capacity of network stations, and therefore on early cooperation with grid operators (Ib1). In addition, 
internal communication about initiatives within Rijkswaterstaat only takes place in loosely structured 
meetings that do not necessarily focus on energy, or are organized on an ad hoc basis (Ii1). There is no 
structure for learning from experiences, whether they are successful or not, of past initiatives regarding 
how to improve coordination between actors (Ii2). This hampers both internal and external harmonization 
efforts.  
 Finally, institutional barriers can also be the result of strong political discourses forming an 
undercurrent in the play of the game. This can be illustrated using the example of the position rule that 
Rijkswaterstaat is not allowed to be the developer who operates RE installations (P5). The following quote 
illustrates that this rule is based on the discourse of the leading political party regarding the relation 
between the State and the market (Ia8): “The position of the State and the market is essentially a political 
choice. With the current coalition [government] the role of Rijkswaterstaat will not be changed, but if 
other parties came to power there might be opportunities.” (Interview employee Rijkswaterstaat). In the 
current political context, therefore, these rules are difficult to change. Moreover, the perception of 
Rijkswaterstaat employees that a rule is difficult to change prevents proactive searches for improved 
harmonization in this regard, with many parties accepting and following rules without questioning them. 
Action at a higher political level, including the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment and 
the parliament, might be crucial in clarifying the responsibilities of Rijkswaterstaat (Ic5; Ia6). However, 
even at this level some key barriers seem to exist. For example, interviewees indicated that it is unlikely 
that the minister will set a target for Rijkswaterstaat regarding RE, because the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs is responsible for RE (Ic4). This illustrates that improving institutional harmonization for spatial 
integration of PV on Rijkswaterstaat lands also requires a political choice with more pro-active policy on 
the level of the ministry, including coordination of both internal harmonization within the policy domain 
of infrastructure (Rijkswaterstaat), and external harmonization between policy domains, specifically, 
between RE and infrastructure.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper develops an analytical approach to explore institutional barriers to spatial integration between 
renewable energy (RE) and other land use functions and provides insight into opportunities for 
institutional harmonization between involved policy domains. Existing literature does recognize the 
importance of institutional perspectives in research on the energy transition (Andrews-Speed, 2016; Cherp 
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et al., 2018; Geels et al., 2016; Suzuki et al., 2016; Turnheim et al., 2015). In the introduction it was noted 
that ill-adjusted and uncoordinated policies and regulations are positioned as causes of institutional 
ambiguity and a lack of institutional harmonization (Grotenbreg and van Buuren, 2018; Lammers and 
Heldeweg, 2016; Negro et al., 2012). However, these studies rarely apply explicit institutional analyses, 
understand institutions mainly as formal rules, and do not provide much insight in how harmonization 
does or could occur. Responding to these research gaps, the analytical approach developed in this paper is 
thoroughly grounded in institutional theory and focuses on the dynamic interaction between established 
‘rules of the game’ and ideas of actors regarding these rules in the ‘play of the game’. As such, the 
approach moves beyond formal and static aspects of institutions and includes opportunities for analyzing 
the co-evolution between formal and informal institutions in a more dynamic fashion. Generally, it can be 
concluded that the approach illustrates the importance of ideas, routines and interpretations (i.e. the play 
of the game), which largely occur on the micro-level, and how these interact with the more formal, 
structuring rules on the meso-level.  
The application of the analytical approach to the case of integrating PV with transport 
infrastructure also provides substantive insights in the process of institutional harmonization that add to 
existing literature. First, the results show that institutional barriers experienced by various actors are often 
interrelated. It can therefore be concluded that, when pursuing institutional harmonization, it is important 
to take into account these interrelations because they can help determine the level at which action is 
required, by whom, and the potential influence of these actions on other experienced barriers and rules for 
efficient action. Secondly, although spatial integration requires external harmonization between policy 
domains, this paper shows that internal harmonization within the respective policy domains is a crucial 
first step. This is related to the third conclusion that the agency component (the play of the game) is key to 
successful harmonization, because this is the part of the arena where actors are often dealing with a lack of 
knowledge and experience. Hence, institutional harmonization is more than merely improving the 
coordination and coherence of formal policies and regulations. Within a context of institutional 
fragmentation and substantive ambiguity of key actors upon their exact roles and responsibilities, 
institutional harmonization becomes dependent on organizational cultures and individual characteristics. 
Whether and how existing and new rules are being applied in practice is dependent on ideas, 
interpretations and deliberations of individuals that are embedded in organizational cultures and practices 
and that are simultaneously shaping these cultures and practices. Therefore, it can be concluded that it is 
of crucial important to ensure the co-evolution between the rules of the game and the play of the game.  
The analytical approach and the conclusions presented here provide interesting avenues for further 
research. First, it would be interesting to compare and add to these insights by exposing the analytical 
approach presented in this paper, to cases exploring integration of RE with different sectors or in different 
contexts. The analytical approach presented can easily be adopted in contexts other than the Dutch. There 
is much room for application of this approach in other contexts with further possibilities for fine-tuning it, 
as the spatial integration of renewable energy and the development of more coherent policies surrounding 
energy transition are at least European if not global issues (Solorio, 2011). Second, this study’s approach 
is a first step in exploring a broader role for institutional approaches that are inclusive of informal 
institutions and actor behavior and interaction in research on the energy transition. This paper 
demonstrates that institutional theory offers opportunities for ‘bridging’ various approaches to studying 
the energy transition as called for by Geels et al. (2016) and Turnheim et al. (2015). Following the call by 
(Andrews-Speed, 2016), a recommendation would therefore be to further explore the role of institutional 
analyses in research regarding the energy transition, including RE generation but also issues of energy 
efficiency and carbon mitigation. Third, it is important to gain more insight into the agency of key actors, 
including the roles and activities these actors perform to navigate circumstances of institutional ambiguity 
and to achieve internal harmonization. Existing theories containing such agency perspectives, such as 
actor-network theory or boundary spanning, can provide valuable insights here.  
This paper illustrates that opportunities for institutional harmonization consist of an interplay of 
mutually coordinated creation of new formal and informal rules, abandonment of certain rules, and 
adaptation or re-interpretation of existing rules within and between policy domains. By pursuing 
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institutional harmonization, space can be organized within and among the various institutional frameworks 
involved to enable the spatial integration of RE with other land use functions. In in other words, when 
looking for physical space for RE generation it is important to also consider its institutional counterpart, 
which can be coined institutional space. 
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Code Interviewees and discussion sessions 
I1 Interview employee Rijkswaterstaat WVL 1 
I2 Interview employee Rijkswaterstaat WVL 2 
I3 Interview employee Rijkswaterstaat WVL 3 
I4 Interview employee Rijkswaterstaat corporate staff  
I5 Interview employee Rijkswaterstaat regional department  
I6 Interview employee Rijkswaterstaat regional department  
I7 Interview employee ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment  
I8 Interview employee grid operator  
I9 Interview employee Central Government Real Estate Agency  
I10 Interview employees consultancy firm  
I11 Interview employee energy company  
I12 Interview employee Groningen Province 
I13 Interview employee Drenthe Province 
I14 Interview employees Friesland Province 
F1 Focus group with employees from Rijkswaterstaat (9), the Central Government Real Estate Agency (2) and the 
Netherlands Enterprise Organization (1) 
 
Table A.2 
Results ‘Rules of the game’ 
Boundary rules define who may enter or leave positions Sources 
B1:  Location: Ownership, governance or management of land or infrastructure assets within a specified area 
determines which actors are involved (e.g. province, municipality, grid operator, and regional department 
of Rijkswaterstaat). 
I2; I6; I8 
B2: Legal: Legal obligations determine that a party needs to be involved (e.g. ministries and Central 
Government Real Estate Agency). 
I2; I9; I14 
B3:  Project: Based on the specific project, additional parties may enter or leave the arena (e.g. advisory 
bureaus, experts from national departments of Rijkswaterstaat, or market parties). 
I1; I5; I10 
B4: Competition: Developers enter the arena based on competition on price. The developer with the highest 
bid may enter the arena.  
I1; I2; I9 
 
Position rules define the positions held by actors Sources 
P1:  Legislators:  
 The ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment is the legislator for i.a. policy regarding 
infrastructure, environment and spatial policy related to renewable energy.  
 The Ministry of Economic Affairs is the legislator for i.a. energy ambitions and policy.  
 The Ministry of Internal Affairs is the legislator for i.a. central government real estate policy.  
I1; I2; I14; F1 
P2: Commissioner: The ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment provides assignments to their 
executive organization Rijkswaterstaat.  
I6; I7; F1 
P3:  Executive organization: Rijkswaterstaat is the executive organization of the Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Enviroment and responsible for design, construction and maintenance of the main infrastructure 
networks in the Netherlands for the purpose of safety, accessibility and livability, which is laid down in 
assignments set by the Ministry. 
I4; I6; I14; F1;  
P4: Developer: A market party or citizen initiative is allowed to develop and exploit solar panels along a 
highway. Rijkswaterstaat is not allowed to hold this position. 
I1; I2; I3; I4; 
I5; I6; F1 
P5: Licensing authorities:  
 Rijkswaterstaat is the licensing authority for the permit on the basis of the Public Works Act 
(Wbr-permit);  
 Municipality or provinces are the licensing authority for the environmental permit. 
I1; I2; I7; I9; 
I14 
P6: Contract-holder: The Central Government Real Estate Agency is the contract-holder for state-owned 
land. 
I2; I3; I6; I9; 
I14 
P7: Grid operator: The grid operator is responsible for realizing the grid connection. I2; I8; I12; I14 
 
Choice rules specify what actors in certain positions may, must or must not do at certain points Sources 
C1: Draft policy and regulation: The ministries may draft policy and regulations for their legislative 
domains (see P1).  
I1; I2; F1 




C3:  Set permit conditions: Rijkswaterstaat may set conditions connected to the Wbr-permit only to ensure 
safety, accessibility and livability of their networks.  
I4; I9 
C4: Organize the auction: The Central Government Real Estate Agency must organize an auction after a 
location is approved for energy generation by Rijkswaterstaat  
I2; I3; I5; I6; 
I7; I9; I10; 
I14 
C5: Submit bid: Every potential developer may submit a bid in the auction procedure. I2; I3; I5; I9; 
F1 
C6: Apply for permits: The developer must apply to the municipality or the province for an environmental 
permit. 
I2; I7;  
C7:  Set permit conditions: Provinces and municipalities may set conditions connected to the environmental 
permit, only to ensure the spatial quality of their territory.  
I12; F1 
C8: Sign the contract: The Central Government Real Estate Agency must sign the private-law agreement for 
surface-rights over the respective area with the developer who submits the highest bid.  
I2; I3; I7; I9; 
I10; I14 
C9: Arrange grid connection: Rijkswaterstaat or the developer may contact the grid operator. The grid 
operator checks whether there is space available on the grid for a new PV park and provides a price 
estimate based on standard rate structures.  
I8; 
C10: Apply for subsidies: After winning the auction, the developer may apply for SDE+ subsidy with the 
Netherlands Enterprise Organization. Government organizations are not eligible for SDE+ subsidies.  
I2; I14 
C11:  Involve citizens: A developer may include citizens participation in the project. I2; I11 
 
Aggregation rules determine how actors jointly affect decisions regarding proposed actions and activities and 
in what manner. 
Sources 
A1: Permit decision: A province or municipality must decide whether to provide an environmental permit 
based on compatibility with the area vision.  
I2; I5; I12; 
I13; I14 
A2: Subsidies: The Ministry of Economic Affairs (or Finances) must decide whether to appoint subsidies to 
developers after they have won the bid and have the necessary permits. 
I2; I10; 
A3: Termination rights: the Central Government Real Estate Agency always includes a clause for 
‘termination in the public interest’ in contracts to safeguard the executive organization’s interests.  
I9 
 
Information rules determine what information is to be send and received by which actors at what moment Sources 
I1: Publishing locations: The Central Government Real Estate Agency must publish locations that are going 
to be auctioned in an open and transparent manner. 
I2; I9 
I2: Regular consultation: The Central Government Real Estate Agency and Rijkswaterstaat have regular 
consultations (once per 4-6 weeks) regarding concrete energy-projects. If discussions have financial 
consequences the ministries are involved as well.  
I2; I9; 
  
Scope rules determine which outcomes may occur Sources 
S1: Infrastructure expansion: Solar panels must not be realized on grounds reserved for expansion of 
infrastructure networks 
I2; I3; I7 
S2: Safety: Solar panels must not compromise the safety of the infrastructure networks.  I1; I4; I5;  
S3: Maintenance: Panels must be accessible to maintenance, and must not hinder maintenance of networks I5; I9; I10 
S4: General agreements: Goals set in the Dutch Energy Agreement (connected to EU targets) and the Paris 
Agreement 
I3; I1;I4; I7 
S5: Target: target stating that Rijkswaterstaat must become energy neutral by 2030. I1; I4; I6; 
I7;I9; I10; I9; 
F1; I14 
S6: Environmental vision: Provinces may indicate preferred locations for solar parks in their area vision (e.g. 
adjacent to build-up areas); they may not indicate who needs to be involved (e.g. participation). 
I2; I12; I13; 
I14 
 
Payoff rules assign costs and benefits to actors Sources 
Y1: Lease: Developers must pay Rijkswaterstaat for the use of the grounds, which is laid down in the 
contract with the R Central Government Real Estate Agency VB and is paid per MWh. A minimum price 
is laid down by the Central Government Real Estate Agency 
I2; I10; I9 
Y2: Earn money: Rijkswaterstaat may use its lands to earn money  I3; I6; I7; I11; 
F1  
Y3: Subsidies: Rijkswaterstaat is not eligible for SDE+ subsidies. I2; I10; I4 
Y4: Project funding: Major construction and renewal projects ( > €30 mln.) are laid down in the MIRT and 
funds must not be used for other purposes than Rijkswaterstaat’s primary tasks.  
I2; I3; I4; I7 
Y5: Performance funding: General maintenance and management of infrastructure networks is laid down in 
the SLA, which includes commitments regarding financial and human resource for four years.  
I2; I3; I5; I7 





Table A.3  
Results ‘Play of the game’ 
Ideas related to boundary rules Sources 
Ib1:  Early involvement: Partners (neighbors and municipalities) should be involved early to create more 
certainty regarding permits and grid connection.  
I2; I3; I5; I7; 
I8; I12; F1 
Ib2: Citizen involvement: Citizen initiatives should compete in auctions according to Rijkswaterstaat and 
the Central Government Real Estate Agency, but they are bound to one location and often lack 
knowledge, competences and experience. 
I2; I5; F1 
Ib3: Reduce fragmentation: Boundary rules related to renewable energy within the organizations of 
Rijkswaterstaat and Infrastructure and the Environment should be clarified to reduce the 
fragmentation of departments and people working on topics related to renewable energy from their 
own position and interest with little coordination.  
I1; I4; I5; I10; 
I11; I14 
Ib4: Province or municipality: Rijkswaterstaat should identify when provinces or municipalities should 
be involved regarding PV at specific locations, because this can differ per province and 
municipalities - if it regulated at all - depending on e.g. the size of the initiative or the procedure.  
I2; I12; I13; 
 
Ideas related to position rules Sources 
Ip1:  Open attitude: Civil servants, especially experts and regular employees (within Rijkswaterstaat and 
the Central Government Real Estate Agency in particular, but provinces, municipalities and grid 
operators are also mentioned), should have a more open and less risk-averse attitude towards 
renewable initiatives. Higher level managers, who are more used to dealing with new ideas, should 
encourage such an attitude. 
I1; I2; I5; I6; 
I7; I8; I10; 
I11; I14;F1 
Ip2: Position of Rijkswaterstaat regarding RE: The position of Rijkswaterstaat regarding the energy 
transition should be clarified; despite statements regarding far-reaching opportunities for PV on 
Rijkswaterstaat lands, Rijkswaterstaat only received the assignment to make the infrastructure 
networks energy neutral, leaving the position regarding the energy transition in general and the 
accompanying role as either facilitator or puller in the middle.  
I1; I4; I5; I6; 
I7; F1; 
Ip3: Contradictory positions within Rijkswaterstaat: Citizen involvement should be a point of attention 
in PV projects, because the ambition of Rijkswaterstaat to make as much money as possible with 
auctioning lands is at odds with the importance of citizen involvement in infrastructure projects 
where quality criteria are always required in bids.  
I5; I6; I11; 
I14; F1 
Ip4: Create problem-owner: There should be a ‘problem-’ or ‘opportunity-owner’, to pull the initiatives, 
create commitment within organizations, address barriers, and reduce the inertia that currently 
characterizes PV on Rijkswaterstaat lands. The creation of the position of ‘ HID sustainability and 
environment’ is considered a step in this direction by Rijkswaterstaat.  
I4; I6; I8; I9; 
I10; I11; I12; 
F1 
Ip5: Adapt organizational culture: Rijkswaterstaat should adapt the culture of the organization so 
employees are aware of the fact that you can have a role in PV projects even if you are not fully 
responsible for the whole project (contrary to the current culture where you are either responsible or 
you are not).  
I6; I14; F1 
   
Ideas related to choice rules Sources 
Ic1: Joint map-making: Rijkswaterstaat should participate in joint-map-making to create insight in 
overlapping interests and opportunities for PV, in relation to other land owners, provinces, 
municipalities and grid-operators.  
I2; I6; I7; I8; 
F1 
Ic2: Area-agenda’s: Strategic cooperation should take place between various parties involved to 
coordinate actions and ideas for future use of space in e.g. area-agenda’s.  
I2; I3; I5; I7; 
I8; I12; F1 
Ic3: Assignment for RE: Rijkswaterstaat is used to acting when given an assignment connected to a 
resource allocation. If more PV need to be realized, Rijkswaterstaat should be given a specific 
assignment in this regard by the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. 
I5; I10; F1 
Ic4: No assignment: Rijkswaterstaat wants an assignments from the ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment, but the ministry does not want to give this assignment because the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs is responsible for RE.  
I1; I7; F1 
Ic5: Fragmentation up to the highest level: Cooperation should be initiated at the highest level to deal 
with the division of responsibilities for infrastructure and (renewable) energy up to the highest level, 
between ministries. 
I1; I7; I14 
Ic6: Responsibility: According to Rijkswaterstaat, municipalities should safeguard citizen interests and 
participation in PV projects on Rijkswaterstaat lands..  
I2; F1 
Ic7: Exception for citizen involvement: Rijkswaterstaat and the Central Government Real Estate Agency 
should allow exceptions from the rule that locations must be auctioned for citizen initiatives for 
I2; I6; I9; F1 
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projects below a certain size. 
Ic8: Structured assessment of Rijkswaterstaat lands: There should be a structured (method for) 
assessment of locations that Rijkswaterstaat deems feasible.  
I5; I7; I10; F1 
 
Ideas related to aggregation rules Sources 
Ia1: Control: Rijkswaterstaat wants to be the single ‘owner’ of a project because this reduces the 
complexity  
I2; I4; F1 
Ia2: Safeguard control over public lands: The Central Government Real Estate Agency and 
Rijkswaterstaat want to keep as much control as possible over grounds which is not compatible with 
third-party ownership over (parts of) Rijkswaterstaat lands.  
I10; F1 
Ia3: Simple, uniform procedures: Rijkswaterstaat and the Central Government Real Estate Agency want 
to keep procedures as simple and uniform as possible because of limited resources, using an auction 
based on price with limited criteria.  
I2; F1 
Ia4: Interdependence: Rijkswaterstaat should coordinate actions with other actors (e.g. developers, grid 
operators, municipalities and provinces) municipalities because, contrary to traditional infrastructure 
projects, Rijkswaterstaat depends on these parties for the realization of energy ambitions.  
I1; I2; I5; I6; 
I7; I9; F1 
Ia5:  Individual persuasion power: The success of initiatives should be less dependent on the right people 
at the right level pulling their weight, thereby making initiatives less ad hoc. 
I1; I10; I14; 
F1 
Ia6: Control within the policy domain: Higher level managers within Rijkswaterstaat or the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment should more often use their power in the hierarchy of the 
organization to enable PV initiatives.  
I1; I5; I10; 
I14; F1 
Ia7: Province or municipality: It should be clarified when provinces and when municipalities must decide 
on environmental permits and municipal and provincial environmental plans should be aligned. 
I2; I12; I13; 
I14 
Ia8:  Political dimension: Parties involved in PV on Rijkswaterstaat lands should be aware of the large 
political dimension of certain decisions (e.g. regarding Rijkswaterstaat role and responsibility in the 
energy transition), especially at the ministerial level which is colored by party-politics.  
I2; I4; I6; 
I10; F1 
 
Ideas related to information rules Sources 
Ii1: Platforms for communication: Platforms should be established to enable structured communication 
within Rijkswaterstaat, between Rijkswaterstaat and the Ministries, and between Rijkswaterstaat and 
other parties at early stages, to function beside current, loosely structured meetings regarding these 
topics.  
I5; I7; I10; 
I12; I13; F1 
Ii2: Learning: Structures should be installed that stimulate learning from initiatives and communication 
of this knowledge to various parts of the organization.  
I6; I10; F1 
Ii3: Lack of connection between policy and practice: Both within Rijkswaterstaat and between 
Rijkswaterstaat and the Ministry, connections between people working on projects (and their 
experiences) and the people involved in policy-making and regulations should be improved.  
I7; I10; I14; 
F1 
Ii4: Contact persons: Rijkswaterstaat should clarify responsibilities for PV within the organization and 
avoid changes in contact persons over the course of projects as much as possible.  
I10; I11; I14 
Ii5: No communication of essential information: Essential information affecting projects should be 
communicated to project-partners immediately.  
I5; I11 
  
Ideas related to scope rules Sources 
Is1: Infrastructure expansion: It should be clarified when potential future expansion of infrastructure 
networks is a valid argument for blocking PV projects.  
I7; I11 
Is2: Risk assessment: It should be clarified how and when PV compromises the safety of infrastructure 
networks.  
I5; I10; I11 
Is3: Too narrow focus: Rijkswaterstaat should watch out for a very narrow focus on energy neutrality for 
themselves, which might hinder (future) opportunities that are beneficial to the energy transition in 
the Netherlands.  
I6; I7; I8; F1 
Is4: Operationalization: Rijkswaterstaat and the Ministry should translate high level ambitions into an 
implementation agenda, with clear goals which should be connected resource allocations, to reduce 
current confusion regarding approaches about: 
 Rijkswaterstaat should become energy neutral or Rijkswaterstaat should contribution to energy 
transition in the Netherlands 
 Rijkswaterstaat should realize a few large scale projects, or Rijkswaterstaat should realize many 
smaller projects 
I1; I4; I5; I7; 
F1 
Is5: Environmental visions: Provinces and municipalities should reach agreements on scope rules for 
environmental permits for PV along infrastructure . 
I2; I12; I14  
Is6: Place-based assessment: The provinces want to assess per project, in the context of the location what 
fits the landscape for solar projects, so exceptions from the rule may be possible but have to be 




Is7: Spatial quality and participation: Provinces want to safeguard spatial quality and participation, but 
unlike spatial quality, participation cannot be safeguarded in the environmental permit.  
I5; I10; I12; 
I13; F1 
 
Ideas related to payoff rules Sources 
Iy1: Subsidies: The ministry of EZ however wants to limit the flow of government funds to government 
parties. This is a conflict of interests which may in the future limit the possibilities for PV on 
Rijkswaterstaat lands.  
I1; F1 
Iy2: Resources: It should be clarified how many resources (time and money) Rijkswaterstaat is allowed to 
spend, since there is no assignment with clear resource allocations (also because there are barely any 
resources programmed in the MIRT or SLA for sustainability, let alone renewable energy).  
I3; I5; I7; I11; 
F1 
Iy3: Assignment with resource allocation: Rijkswaterstaat is an executive organization focused on executing 
assignments given by the Ministry and should therefore be given an assignment with clear resource 
allocations and consequences for not meeting the assignment.  
I1; I2; I3; I5; 
I10; F1 
Iy4: Energy as a primary task: RE should become a primary task of Rijkswaterstaat to deal with the fact that 
the parliament (particularly with the current leading political party being liberal) disapproves of project 
costs that are not directly related to the primary tasks of Rijkswaterstaat.  
I2; I4; F1 
Iy5: Include quality criteria in the bid: Quality criteria regarding e.g. citizen involvement should be part of 
the bid to enable developers to use experiences with citizen participation and reduce possible resistance. 
I11; I14; F1;  
Iy6: Resource competition: it should be clarified who pays for what between the Ministries of Infrastructure 
and the Environment and Economic Affairs, e.g. who’s employees will execute which tasks and how 
these employees are financed  
I7; I9; I14 
Iy7: Clarity on costs and benefits of options: Rijkswaterstaat should clarify the costs and benefits of the 
various options that are discussion among ideas regarding scope rules, not only for Rijkswaterstaat itself 
but for the Netherlands as a whole.  
I1; I10; F1 
 
 
